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Resumen
Este trabajo se propone explicar el papel que desempeñan los mercenarios en los conflictos 
internacionales contemporáneos, como actores con capacidad para determinar sus dinámicas y 
desenlaces. Busca, además, contribuir con una visión objetiva de la privatización del uso de la 
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fuerza, mediante un análisis de la naturaleza, contexto y estructura organizacional de 
los ejércitos mercenarios de la Grecia clásica, y una aproximación a las nuevas formas 
corporativas del mercenarismo como, por ejemplo, las compañías militares privadas de 
hoy para concluir que este tipo de actores constituye un elemento característico de la 
conflictividad internacional
Palabras clave
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Abstract
This paper aims at explaining the role that the mercenaries have in contemporary 
international conflicts, as performers with a great capacity to determine their dynamics 
and outcomes. It also aims at providing an objective view of the privatization of the 
use of the force by means of an analysis of the nature, context and organizational 
structure of the mercenary armies of the Classic Greece and an approximation to the 
new corporative ways of the mercenarism, for example, the current private military 
companies, to conclude that this kind of actors constitute a characteristic element of 
the international dispute.
Keywords
Conflict, international conflict, power, security, war, State.
Résumé
Ce travail cherche à expliquer le rôle joué par les mercenaires dans les conflits 
internationaux contemporains en tant qu’acteurs capables de déterminer leurs 
dynamiques et dénouements. Il cherche aussi à donner une perspective objective sur 
la privatisation de l’usage de la force, à partir d’une analyse de la nature, du contexte 
et d’une structure organisationnelle des armées mercenaires de la Grèce classique, en 
donnant une approche aux nouvelles formes corporatives du mercenarisme telles que 
les compagnies militaires privées pour conclure que ce type d’acteurs constituent un 
élément caractéristique des conflits internationaux.
Mots clés
Conflits, conflits internationaux, pouvoir, sécurité, guerre, État
Resumo
Este trabalho se propõe explicar o papel que desempenham os mercenários nos 
conflitos internacionais contemporâneos, como atores com uma grande capacidade 
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para determinar suas dinâmicas e resultado. Procura, também, contribuir a uma visão 
objetiva da privatização do uso da força, através de uma análise da natureza, contexto 
e estrutura organizacional dos exércitos mercenários da Grécia Clássica, e uma 
aproximação às novas formas corporativas do mercenarismo, como por exemplo, as 
companhias militares privadas de hoje, para concluir que este tipo de atores constitui 
um elemento característico da conflitualidade internacional.
Palavras-chave
Conflito, conflito internacional, poder, segurança, guerra
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Introduction
The current dynamics of the conflicts involves a variety of actors, who in the 
past did not have the same importance in the origin, development and outcome of 
them. From the neorealist perspective of international relations, the international 
system is state-centric and any actor  different from the state only has a peripheral 
relevance, so that the political actions performed by him, especially the war as 
an instrument to ensure national interests, would have a custodial or exclusive 
character and no other entity would be able to rival its power. That is to say, 
that the state maintains its ability to confront other states or respond to security 
threats, from terrorist organizations or separatist groups, for example.
In terms of the conventional or interstate war, which could also be called 
traditional, the state can face their opponents by itself or through alliances 
with other states. But the emergence of revolutionary / counterrevolutionary 
war, from the nineteenth century, demanded that the colonial powers consider 
new ways to prevail in war, being exposed to the siege of non-state groups, 
which were pursuing independence or secession with fighting methods and 
organizational structures that they were not used to, and that put into question 
the usefulness of their hierarchies, strategies and tactics.
It is all about a parallel context to the continuity of the confrontations of 
interstate character, with the preeminence of those ones in the first half of 
the twentieth century, but which becomes more common after the Cold War 
(Peñas, 1997), when the bipolarity of the international system generates an 
indirect confrontation between the United States and the Soviet Union, with 
the support of each towards governments and armed groups that are favorable 
to their strategic interests in Latin America, Africa, Middle East and Southeast 
Asia. Thus, the logic of war underwent a change with the interaction between 
state and non-state actors, finding, in any case, their starting point in scenarios 
such as the Spanish Civil War of 1936, between republicans and nationalists 
and which ended with the victory of the latter, and the Popular War promoted 
by Mao Tse-Tung in China, in 1949. Both wars have served as a paradigm for 
the formation of Latin American communist guerrillas, as well as organizations 
such as the African National Congress in South Africa or the Organization for 
the Liberation of Palestine.
However, the environment of the post-Cold War has a higher complexity and 
Mary Kaldor’s approaches (2001) transcend the dichotomy of conventional warfare 
and revolutionary / counterrevolutionary war, to move towards a distinction 
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between old and new wars, according to elements like the political objectives of the 
actors, their methods of struggle, means or sources of funding and organizational 
structure. In Kaldor’s perspective, the idea of the State having a limited power to 
face the challenges proposed by actors such as the terrorist groups, the international 
networks of the organized crime or phenomena like piracy and the growing role 
of the mercenaries, either individually or linked to military companies of private 
security (Mayer, 2009). With this diversity of actors, the notion of distribution of 
power in the international system (Waltz, 1979) becomes important, because it 
becomes useful to explain a reality that is difficult to question: that power is diffused 
among a multiplicity of entities and the state monopoly of legitimate violence is not 
so obvious, so that the state’s capacity to resolve internal or international conflicts 
is conditioned by the actions of other actors.
In this context, the mercenary seems to be a key subject in the development 
of most  of the violent conflicts, including prevention and even the balance 
of forces of those who face each other. In this regard, the levels of conflict of 
Heidelberg Institute for International Conflict Research (HIIK, its acronym 
in German) are useful to understand the time when the mercenary military 
or private security company enters the scene. This institution distinguishes 
between non-violent and violent conflicts, to establish five levels of intensity: 
levels of dispute and nonviolent crisis are assigned to the non-violent actors, 
and levels of violent crisis, limited war and war violent correspond to the 
violent ones (Conflict Barometer, 2013). It is worth noting that the armed 
actors, especially the mercenaries, are characteristic of violent conflicts and 
their three levels of intensity.
This work is aimed at explaining the objective importance of mercenaries 
in international conflicts, highlighting the advantages, risks and consequences 
of their actions. In addition, it intends to state that they are not new actors in 
the war, and rather that they have participated in it since ancient times, and for 
such effect, a comparison between the mercenaries of classical Greece (sixth to 
fourth centuries BC) and today’s, an exercise that will help us understand its 
evolution through 2500 years of history.
Greek Mercenaries 
One of the top works of literature and classical Greek history, The Anabasis 
of Cyrus (also known as The Persian Expedition or The Expedition of the 
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10,000), of the military historian Xenophon, recounts an episode from the late 
V century BC, in which, Cyrus the Young, governor of the satrapy of Minor 
Asia, plans to dethrone his brother Artaxerxes II, king of Persia. To achieve 
this, he recruited an army that included 13,000 Greek mercenaries (the figure 
varies, depending on their being Greek or Persian sources, from 10,000 to 
13,000, and is known as myriad, or myriás, which was the unit of measure 
of the Persian armies, or myríoi, expression used by Xenophon to refer to an 
innumerable or large army), with whom he undertook the expedition from 
the east coast of the Aegean Sea into Persia. In this story, most of the army 
flees in disarray before its defeat in the famous Battle of Cunaxa, near Babylon, 
while 13,000 Greek soldiers remain united in the fight, under the command 
of Clearco, Spartan commander. Being defeated, they must negotiate with 
the enemy and Greek commanders are beheaded, so the mercenaries elect 
the Athenian Xenophon as the new commander, who guides on the journey 
back to Greece.
The Greeks did not know the term mercenary and the environment in which 
these were developing was very different from today. First, the city-state forged 
particular social, economic and political relations, where the mercenaries we 
know today would have little or no space, while those of that time occupied 
an important place in social life, acting, for example as mediators in relations 
between the aristocracy and the rulers of the Mediterranean in classical Greece, 
and not only as combatants. The people who took part in the discussion of 
public affairs in the Assembly (Ekklesia), were generally the same ones going to 
war on behalf of their cities, and they are well documented by Thucydides, in 
the History of the Peloponnesian War and Herodotus, in history. Thus, the war 
was a central issue in public life and was a civic obligation to fight for the Polis, 
so that citizenship was honored in war (Marinovic, 1988), establishing then an 
identity between citizen and soldier, for they were the same person, as when 
they speak of the peasant as a soldier and the soldier as a peasant, defining the 
Greek citizen as a soldier owner of a piece of land, who went to war to defend 
three things: his city, land and freedom (the symbiotic relationship between 
private property and the idea of freedom come from Greece), bringing his own 
weapons and resources.
Greek or hoplite soldier (hoplités) had a strong sense of community, and 
the hoplite infantry was structured around the idea of mutual protection (each 
soldier protecting himself and watched over his partner), and this is why the 
war was of a political nature for the Greek citizen: if the war was not assumed, 
the community and the ties that had been built around it could disappear. The 
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links, as the one between parents and children, or the independent farmer and 
his land, they articulated in turn the relationship between war and political 
life of the community, a union that began to break with the appearance of 
mercenaries, expert and more professional soldiers, who dedicated exclusively 
to military matters and whose skills surpassed those of  the traditional hoplites 
(Marinovic, 1988). Undoubtedly, the relationship among war, socio-economic 
structure and the politics of Greece changed dramatically with the increasing 
incorporation of mercenaries into the armies, since a new division of labor 
made the peasant lose his independence to the extent of his renouncing his 
politic responsibilities renounced their policies to entrust the protection of his 
home and his State to a warfare specialist.
From the reforms implemented by Solon, with its 594 BC Constitution, 
Athenian society was ordered according to the role that each individual played 
within the state and in the conduct of the war as well as  in regards to his ability 
to provide the necessary weapons for military service (Trundle, 2004). Thus, 
there were three recognized strata: the richest citizens formed the cavalry 
(hippeis); smallholders and traders formed the infantry (hoplitai), and the 
poor farmers or land workers (zeugitai), neither went to war nor had civil and 
political rights. With the introduction of mercenaries, economic relations in 
Greece experienced a change by virtue of the compensation that they received 
in exchange for their service to the polis as warriors, i.e., a new type of social 
relationship was established, by assuming the participation in the war as a job 
for which the citystate hired a specialist. It is clear, then, that the mercenary 
represented a major social, economic and political phenomenon for the life 
of classical Greece. So much, that they began to form independent military 
communities outside the polis, where individuals shared a task, a series of 
economic aspirations and growing significance, determined by the needs and 
strategic objectives of the city-state in war.
According to Trundle,
Cyrus’s experiences and his Greek mercenaries provided a paradigm for 
future events. Between 399 and 330 B.C., there were many attempts from 
the satraps to get independence from the Great King. The collapse of the 
unity of the Persian Empire led to the prolific use of Greek mercenaries 
to help maintain the imperial authority, or to prevent it from collapsing. 
The military campaigns were becoming more frequent and peasants found 
it difficult to leave their land to go fight in the war, so the appearance of 
specialist soldiers, such as archers, launchers and light troops, capable of 
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conducting complex maneuvers and use special weapons, forced states to 
hire trained professionals who would ensure more accurate results on the 
battlefield. (2004, p. 7).
The fourth century B.C. opened new ways to specialization and 
professionalization of the war, and favored great opportunities for mercenaries, 
who knew that in each region there would be work for them, and at different 
times of the year. This epoch, besides the great war events that characterize it, 
has been called by some historians as the Great Greek mercenary explosion of 
the fourth century (Miller, 1984).
There are some terms that can be associated with the category of mercenary 
in classical times, in the absence of a specific name to refer to it. (Trundle, 
2004). Among the most known and used by Greek historians and military 
strategists, the Epikouros stands out, which would mean parallel fighter or 
assistant, to refer to the who fights alongside the regular soldier or Stratiotes. 
Second, Xenos, which refers generically to the foreigner, and applied to the 
V century’s wars would explain the foreign-born fighter. Later, towards the 
end of the V century B.C. and throughout the fourth century. B.C., the xenos 
began to be called misthophoros, or employee, referring to the soldier who 
receives a salary, and this was the most common term used by Greek historians 
of the period of the Classic Rome. The Employee status seems to be marked 
by a pejorative connotation, because receiving a financial compensation in 
exchange for a service contravened aristocratic values. Moreover, working 
meant a way to give up freedom (eleutheria) and independence (autarcheia) 
for the aristocrats, so the speakers, when seeking to discredit or denigrate their 
opponents, would use words related to a salary or contract.
However, the Athenian, Spartan aristocracy and, in general, of all the 
Hellenic world, was aware of the historical moment that the region lived and 
that the economic, political and military power would allow them to project 
both the Ionian and the Aegean Sea, to form coalitions which then would 
lead to the building of empires (Miller, 1984). In the case of the Athenian 
Empire, the commercial and territorial positioning during the Persian Wars, 
demanded superior military capabilities to those required to defend the polis, 
and Athens was willing, as indeed it was proved, to invest huge amounts of 
resources to consolidate its power against Persia, and mercenaries acted as 
an effective instrument to achieve that goal, because they were abundant 
in the region and their level of expertise before the conventional hoplite 
infantry was their greatest quality. Then the Greek aristocracy was prey of a 
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political contradiction, by rejecting the figure of the mercenary in the areas 
of public deliberation of the polis, but admitting its need to determine better 
results in foreign wars.
The Organizational structure of the Greek  
mercenary armies
In the analysis of the forms of organization of the groups and their structure, 
the criteria applied nowadays to the context of the new wars can be adapted 
to better understanding of the mercenary phenomenon in classical times, the 
relationships woven between mercenary soldiers and their employers, as well 
as the hierarchies established within the mercenary armies. Considering this, 
the notions of form or organizational chart, organizational and operational 
elements, and global scope (Cragin, Daly, 2004), fit in the mercenary dynamics 
of the V century B.C. and firstly, it can be assumed that the relations between 
the mercenary and his employer were basically economic, of payment, 
although there were other relevant factors to determining the position of each 
one in the battlefield.
The employer (misthodotes), responsible for recruiting and hiring 
mercenaries, was, likewise, the one who paid the wages and in many cases 
acted as a commander of the units. In short, he was the hierarchical superior 
of the mercenary and to whom he should pay service and obedience. However, 
the employer was not always independent and was subject to the decisions of 
rulers of the poleiso of Persian satraps, i.e., he had an intermediate position of 
power between the mercenary and the political leader, either in the Persian 
Empire or in any Greek city -State.
Often, the Persian kings commissioned generals, princes or ambassadors 
the formation of mercenary armies from Greek troops, and a relationship in 
which the employer had his own army, composed of native or local forces was 
established, and  it was complemented with «barbarian troops» (term used by 
the Persians to refer to the Greek mercenary troops), and led by Greek generals 
or strategoi (Trundle, 2004), whose presence in the battlefield led to friction, 
due to the power conflicts that those ones had with the employers, for not 
possessing autonomy to command operations and be subject to their orders. 
As Trundle says,
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The generals or strategoi were used by the kings or princes to lead campaigns, 
rather than play any diplomatic or mediation task between cities. They were 
in charge of commanding operations in the battlefield, and to mediate 
relations between the employer and junior officers or first line privates. A 
general could be both a noted character in the life of the polis, and a simple 
man with the ability to raise a small mercenary army for any campaign. His 
status was not well defined, for it was not a necessary condition to occupy a 
prominent position in the polis (2004, p. 134).
Apart from the organizational structure, the consideration about the 
national identity of mercenaries or their loyalty to the poleis they came from 
is important for the comparison that has been proposed with contemporary 
mercenaries. The multiplicity of city-states scattered along the shores of the 
Aegean and the Ionian Sea, forged less strong identities than the modern 
ones, boosted by the nation- State. The absence of a national Greek identity, 
because of the constant rivalries among poleis competing for a space in power 
in each island or mainland, facilitated the mobility of mercenaries, who did 
not feel constrained by emotional ties with their homeland. In fact, the first 
attempts of Greek unity came in the form of federations or leagues, as the 
Delian League, the Peloponnesian League or Aegean League, but they were 
organized more around pragmatic and strategic objectives than for sympathy 
or common values, and the most paradigmatic example is the recognized 
General Peace of the fourth century, or Koine Eirene, among Sparta, Athens 
and other city-states.
The 21st century mercenaries: the controversial  
figure of the security contractor
As it was explained at the beginning, the evolution of the violent conflicts 
have been marked by  the appearance, in every epoch, of new actors who 
pursue different political, economic, social or religious objectives, as well as the 
interactions that occur among them. And the mercenaries, as demonstrated 
in the first part, have played a central role in conflicts from classical times. 
Establishing the importance of mercenaries in the  international conflicts 
today, has led various authors to reassess the idea that they constitute a novelty 
in the context of organized violence of post-Cold War (Kaldor, 2001), since 
if there is evidence of its historical continuity, any discussion on that matter 
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should focus on the transformation of the phenomenon over a period of 2,500 
years. At the same time, that evidence provides elements to differentiate the 
environment of the military confrontation in the Greek international stage of 
the sixth to fourth centuries B.C., from the characteristics of today’s conflicts, 
dissipating any attempt to reduce the reality of the mercenary to a case of 
violence privatization.
In his distinction between old and new wars, Mary Kaldor speaks of general 
guidelines for their development, and notices a change in the type of violent 
conflicts that recur in every region of the world: the proliferation of interstate 
conflicts until the end of the Cold War, moving towards the abundance of 
internal or intrastate conflicts with a regional or international impact, which 
occur in the concert of globalization and in weakening situations of the nation 
state, along with the erosion of the monopoly of state legitimate violence and 
increasing difficulty of the states to face new threats to their stability. These 
would be suitable  circumstances for the emergence of jihadist groups or 
separatists, drug cartels and human trafficking, in the same way they would 
be useful to explain the growing need of the states to resort to the services of 
the PMCs (private military companies), which would be the contemporary 
version of the mercenary armies (Moesgaard, 2013).
That point of view favors a possible relation between the weakness of 
the state and the presence of mercenaries in conflicts that the first one with 
its power has neither got to prevent nor resolve. But the reality of these 
actors gives an account of the greater complexity, since its performance, 
although oriented to unstable societies and, therefore, unable to contain 
the violent competition among groups for the territory, resources or 
political power, has been conceived by strong and organized states, with 
political, economic and social stability, holders of a recognized ability to 
project their national interests. In other words, groups of mercenaries 
may arise as a result of the state weakness to deal with the problem of 
widespread violence, but this is not the only condition on which their 
existence depends (Mayer, 2009).
Unlike the limited role that the Greek, Roman and Persian mercenaries 
preformed as warriors, strategists or mediators, the scope of the current 
mercenary enjoys a great extent, and their tasks can range from intervention 
in crisis situations, to consulting and security advice for private companies. 
Under these conditions, the mercenary has a versatile feature, adaptable to 
spaces that do not always involve armed confrontation, although it remains the 
50 Juan David García Ramírez
REVISTA DE LA FACULTAD DE DERECHO Y CIENCIAS POLÍTICAS - UPB
ISSN: 0120-3886 / ISSN: 2390-0016 (En línea) / Vol. 47 / No. 126
enero - junio 2017 / Medellín, Colombia 
main source of work. And for that reason, today’s mercenary can also be called 
security contractor, which does not mean that all private security provider can 
be considered a mercenary.
The private force market
There are numerous factors that explain the rise of private military 
companies, and the recourse to them by the state to intervene in military and 
security operations (Mayer, 2009). The most important is the end of the Cold 
War, which resulted in the deactivation or rethinking of the role of the armed 
forces in many countries; the trend towards privatization, promoted by Ronald 
Reagan and Margaret Thatcher in the 1980s; the higher efficiency of the private 
sector to the public one; the growing need for specialized technology in the 
field of security and defense; as well as the inability of some states to assume 
the costs of undertaking military action in conflict settings.
The private force, valid term to define the type of force different  to the 
public or state force, has evolved from individual mercenary activities, to 
more corporate, professional forms legitimized by the states. Today, the 
private Military security companies do confine themselves to the provision 
of weapons or trained combatants to intervene in violent conflicts, and have 
become providers of knowledge and valuable information for governments 
and businesses, especially in the field of intelligence, making it possible to say 
that the world is witnessing a new generation of private military companies. 
Anyway, the visible commitment of these organizations in affairs that were 
exclusive to the State have awaken the concern of governments, international 
organizations and groups in civil society since the 1990s, especially when 
groups such as Executive Outcomes and Sandline played a decisive role in 
resolving conflicts such as the ones in Sierra Leone, Angola and Papua, New 
Guinea between 1994 and 1997 (Trundle, 2004), intervening as forces with 
enough power and resources to defeat the illegal armed groups operating in 
these countries .
While the participation of the private sector in research and development 
of military technology has been seen as a normal and acceptable for the 
maintenance of the State modern and viable defense apparatus, the State 
exercise of legitimate violence by private companies generates all kinds of 
disputes and does not seem something desirable from the political, legal or 
moral point of view (Moesgaard, 2013). However, as states require a greater 
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commitment of these companies in conflict settings, the situation is assumed 
as something usual and its strategic effectiveness seems indisputable. Indeed, 
the awareness of the transformation of war allows an objective understanding 
of the role of these actors in the 21st century. The States face challenges such as 
budgetary constraints for security and defense, demographic contraction or 
changing conditions in armed conflicts, which demand pragmatic responses, 
adjusted to reality. For the United States, Great Britain or Russia, for example, 
the response to security threats or the way to act elsewhere, has long ceased to 
be conventional and has been adapted to the multiplicity of non-state actors 
who put in risk their interests.
The definition of the scope of military private security companies, or 
PMCs, tends to be confusing and it brings the «military» and «security» terms 
together. Shearer (1998, p. 69) argues that «military companies are designed 
to produce a strategic impact, while private security companies are limited to 
protect the property or personnel of a particular entity.» Meanwhile, Singer 
(2008) offers a distinction starting from the space in which each company 
provides its services, explaining that there is a distance between ensuring the 
security of a residential complex or administer a prison, and advise and train 
police forces or military men in Iraq, Afghanistan and Croatia. Private military 
security companies help to dilute the distinction between the sphere of security 
(the police) and defense (the army) when they intervene in both.
The debate on the power and reach of the private force and its rationale, 
suggests the concern of whether it is a matter of state sovereignty or international 
relations or public policies and governance, or public international law. Apart 
from the national and transnational spaces, the public or private sphere, 
the private security military companies are neither limited to a national 
operational level, as initially the national armies of the states would be, nor 
recruit their members according to their nationality. In that sense, the concept 
of security and the private use of the force transcend conventional boundaries. 
As Moesgaard argues,
In 1995, Executive Outcomes was hired by the government of Sierra Leone 
to fight the RUF, which controlled large regions of the country and exports 
of natural resources. Services for which it was required were: basic training, 
intelligence, assistance in combat and use of radar for night attacks. After 
ten months, the country had been pacified and for the first time in twenty-
three years it was possible to hold presidential elections in March 1996 
(2013, p. 10).
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The example of Executive Outcomes and Sandline in the nineties, in the 
same way as that of the American Blackwater, with its intervention in Iraq in 
recent years, has promoted the construction of useful definitions to understand 
the impact of these organizations in the context of contemporary conflicts.
Singer (2008) speaks of Military Providing Firms, to refer to companies that 
provide combat services, i.e. they lend their troops for the battlefield. Second, 
there are Military Consultant Firms, responsible for providing advice and 
training, as well as analysis and strategic, operational and organizational training, 
but which do not get engaged in the battlefield. And finally, he speaks of Military 
Support Firms that provide non-lethal support, logistical assistance, technical 
support and transportation. With this type, Singer suggests that the range of 
action in the market of private force is so broad that it would be simplistic to 
reduce it to the use of violence by private companies. In particular, the third type 
firms contribute to a less negative view of this market, given that they combine 
military and civil skills and assign greater value to knowledge and information.
Today, and as a conclusion, another issue comes up to the surface and is 
related to the utility of military private security companies as instruments of the 
state, or in other words, their ability to maximize the opportunities of the State 
in international relations in a context of conflict proliferation and international 
anarchy. For some authors as Spearin (2007), these companies can help states 
in solving low intensity conflicts, where engaging military forces lacks the 
support of the public opinion. This perspective points at a benefit of the State, 
by the assumption of a more effective foreign and security policy while the 
political costs of intervention are reduced. Others, like Ballard (2007), argue 
that the close cooperation between the state and these companies generate a 
spiral of economic and political interests that compromise the transparency 
of the government and the legislature, and cause a great waste of resources 
that the taxpayers provide. It would be evident, then, the erosion of the State 
authority and its permeability before the power of private actors.
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